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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DUTIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNAFFILIATED
DIRECTORS OF MUTUAL FUNDS *
ROBERT H. iIIUNDHEIM t
Recent discussions of problems in the mutual fund industry-
notably in the Securities and Exchange Commission's Report of the
Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth' and at
a Conference held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School in
early February '-contain numerous statements of opinion that, in
many cases, unaffiliated directors of mutual funds have not performed
an effective role in safeguarding the interests of mutual fund share-
holders. The Commission report concluded that unaffiliated directors
normally lack the power to exercise meaningful restraints on the
investment adviser or principal underwriter of the fund with respect
to management fees, sales loads or brokerage transactions.' In his
typically vivid way, a leading critic of the mutual fund industry has
argued that since "the men who need to be watched pick the watch-
dogs," no one can expect the unaffiliated directors to oppose the adviser
or the underwriter in areas in which the adviser's or underwriter's
economic interests are heavily at stake.4 These conclusions have not
gone unchallenged.5
Despite its conclusions about the ultimate effectiveness of un-
affiliated directors, the Commission report stated that they "can and
should play an active role in representing the interests of share-
holders . . . [in] areas where the interests of the professional
managers may not coincide with those of the company and its public
investors." ' Indeed, the report made a number of recommendations
* This Comment bears a date of April 30, 1967.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.A. 1954, LL.B.
1957, Harvard University. Member, New York Bar.
1 H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) '[hereinafter cited as SEC
Mutual Fund Report].
2 University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U.
PA. L. Ray. 659 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Conference].
3 SEC Mutual Fund Report 130-31, 148.
4 Conference 739 (comments of Abraham L. Pomerantz). To put it another way,
no one will be nominated as an unaffiliated director (nor will anyone accept the
position) unless he is satisfied that the existing situation is one which he can support.
Men do not normally become unaffiliated directors because they wish to change the
existing structure.
5 Conference 741, 755 (comments of Joseph E. Welch), 745-46, 759 (comments
of Allan F. Conwill).
o SEC Mutual Fund Report 148.
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designed to strengthen the position of the unaffiliated directors" Thus,
whether or not the Investment Company Act of 1940 8 is eventually
amended to reflect some or all of the Commission's recommendations,
it appears that the unaffiliated directors will continue to have an
important role in representing the interests of mutual fund shareholders.
Whatever the validity of the view that unaffiliated directors realis-
tically do not have the power to provide effective representation for
mutual fund shareholders, inadequacies which exist probably are
heightened by the frequently vague and incorrect views which un-
affiliated directors (and others) have of the scope of their duties and
responsibilities. Some writing has explored the duties and responsi-
bilities of mutual fund directors-particularly Alfred Jaretzki, Jr.'s
helpful article in the Summer 1964 issue of Law and Contemporary
Problems.9 However, there is room for further exploration of this
subject and a need for the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the mutual fund industry to develop some guidelines for the un-
affiliated directors. These comments are designed to further the
dialogue which I hope will result in the formulation of such guidelines.
Men who accept positions as unaffiliated directors often picture
their role as identical to that which they (or their friends) play as
directors of industrial or other corporations. This picture inade-
quately reflects the special nature of mutual funds, and does not high-
light certain distinctions between mutual funds and other corporations
which make the role of unaffiliated directors of mutual funds par-
ticularly important.
In the usual corporate situation, the interests of management and
shareholders are identical on most matters. Management and share-
holders alike are interested in having the products or services sold
by the corporation produced at the lowest possible cost; they both hope
that the price received for these products will, in the long run, be as
high as possible, thereby maximizing profits. The shareholders' in-
terest in receiving as high a price as possible for the corporate product
runs counter to the interest of the consumers of the product.,
A mutual fund primarily sells professional management of a
diversified investment portfolio. The consumer of this product is the
shareholder. The producer of the investment management is typically
an investment adviser, organized as a separate business entity, some
7 Id. 332-34.
854 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §80a (1964).
9Jaretzki, Duties & Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROR. 777 (1964). Other helpful discussions appear in Eisenberg & Lehr,
Au Aspect of the Emerging "Federal Corporation La&': Directorial Responsibility
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 20 RnmGEs L. REV. 181 (1966) ; Conwill,
The Minwrity Menace to Mutual Fund Selling, 18 Bus. LAW. 1055, 1060-61 (1963).
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of whose chief executives or employees serve on the board of directors
or as officers of the mutual fund which is being advised. In addition,
the persons who control the investment adviser normally control or
have a substantial interest in the principal underwriter of the fund's
shares. Although the managers of the mutual fund and its consumer-
shareholders have parallel interests (for example, with respect to the
quality of investment performance), there are important areas in which
their interests may conflict-particularly in the setting of management
fees and sales charges, and in certain decisions relating to portfolio
transactions. In these areas the consumers' interest in low cost con-
flicts with management's interest in maximization of its profits. These
important conflict of interest areas (which grow out of the special
structure of the mutual fund business) define the special problems and
responsibilities of the unaffiliated directors.
Conflicts of interest also exist in the usual corporate situation,
albeit normally to a much more limited extent. For example, when
the compensation of the officers of a corporation is determined, and
some of the officers sit on the board of directors, the interests of the
officer-directors conflict with the interests of the shareholders of the
corporation. But in this situation the compensation paid for the
personal services rendered by such officer-directors is relatively easy
to identify, since the salaries and other compensation are paid or
credited directly to the individual executives. The ease of identifying
the amount paid permits both the directors and the shareholders of the
corporation to determine the reasonableness of such compensation.' 0
However, in the mutual fund industry, fund directors and officers
are often paid no salary or only nominal salaries by the fund itself.
The more meaningful compensation of the affiliated officers and di-
rectors is derived from the investment adviser, sometimes from an
affiliated broker or underwriter serving the fund, and, at times, from
a combination of these. The complex corporate relationships which
have developed in the mutual fund industry have made it difficult to
deal with this aspect of conflict of interest. Form N-1R, the report
which each fund must file annually with the SEC, tries to provide a
picture of all the compensation received by certain officers and di-
rectors from various aspects of the mutual fund's business." Even
this picture is not complete. For example, it does not reflect com-
pensation in the form of the increased value of an affiliated director's
or officer's shares in the fund's investment adviser, or compensation
10 In addition, managerial compensation usually constitutes only a relatively small
part of the total operating budget of the corporation.
"Form N-1R, item 1.12, 17 C.F.R. §274.101, at 198 (Supp. 1966).
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from the fund's investment adviser or broker whose income from non-
fund sources exceeds fifty per cent of its gross income.
Further, and again because of the special characteristics of the
mutual fund and the complex corporate interrelationships which have
developed around it, the unaffiliated directors will find that the full-
time directors and officers-those people who know most about the
operations of the fund and to whom they would naturally look
for information and advice--often have interests in a number of
areas which are different from those of the shareholders of the
mutual fund. The interest of some of the affiliated persons in
management or underwriting fees has already been pointed out.
Another area in which the interests of these full-time directors
and officers may conflict with the interests of shareholders involves
fund portfolio transactions. The brokerage generated by such trans-
actions can buy various services and also can be used to reward the
sale of fund shares.' The primary beneficiary of these uses of the
brokerage may not be the fund itself." Moreover, in some instances
directors and officers of the fund may be affiliated with a brokerage
firm which does portfolio business for the fund, and thus may share
directly in the brokerage profits from the fund's portfolio business.
One danger presented by these conflicts is that certain members of
the management of the fund may have an incentive to encourage a
rate of portfolio turnover greater than that which would be dictated
solely by considerations of investment management. Another danger
is that efforts by such persons to reward particular brokers can create
temptations to execute transactions in markets which may not be the
best, or at costs which may not be the lowest, for such transactions.
These examples suggest only some of the major areas of conflict
of interest which can exist. The framers of the Investment Company
Act of 1940 realized that unless mutual fund managers were to be
precluded from serving anyone but the fund, substantial conflicts would
exist between the interests of the management group and the interests
of the mutual fund shareholders. To insure that these conflicts of
interest would be properly resolved, i.e., with sufficient attention to
the interests of the fund's shareholders, the Investment Company Act
12 The kinds of services which may be purchased with brokerage commissions
are described in the SEC Mttual Fiund Report at 162-67. The techniques by which
such services are purchased with brokerage commissions are described in the SEC
Mutual Fund Report at 167-72.
13 Since management fees are normally calculated as a percentage of net assets
managed, growth in the size of the fund will normally increase the amount of the
management fee paid to the adviser and also the profit of the adviser. See text accom-
panying note 19 infra. There does not seem to be any clear evidence that growth in
the size of a fund confers equally substantial benefits on the fund shareholder. See
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, T.R. REP.
No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1962).
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of 1940 provided, inter alia, that every mutual fund would have one
or more unaffiliated directors who would serve as watchdogs over
the shareholders' interests.'4  The responsibility of such unaffiliated
directors to serve as critical overseers of the activities of the mutual
fund is, therefore, both heavy and broad. This responsibility is
not made lighter by the fact that the Investment Company Act of 1940
does not prescribe specific solutions for the resolution of each of these
conflicts. Their resolution is normally left to the imagination and
responsible judgment of the directors, and particularly the unaffiliated
directors, in the realization that the varying circumstances under which
these conflicts of interest situations arise may call for a variety of
solutions.
I now want to turn to the unaffiliated director's responsibility in
arranging for the investment advice to be provided to the fund and in
arranging for the distribution of the fund's shares.' The discussion
of these specific problems will not produce formulas which can be
mechanically followed. At best it will suggest problems which un-
affiliated directors must recognize and questions which they should ask.
Arrangements for Providing Investment Advice
A mutual fund can secure investment advice in a variety of ways,
ranging from the generation of advice from within the fund itself by
its own employees, to an arrangement with a separate entity (the
investment adviser) which agrees to provide such advice. In addi-
tion to advisory services, the investment adviser may provide a wide
range of managerial services.
Whenever an arrangement is made by which an outside person
or separate entity undertakes regularly to serve or act as investment
adviser for a mutual fund, the Investment Company Act of 1940 re-
quires that the arrangement be embodied in a written agreement. This
agreement must, in the first instance, be approved by the vote of a
majority of the outstanding voting securities of the fund. It must
contain a provision allowing it to be terminated, without penalty, by
the board of directors of the fund, or by a vote of a majority of its
outstanding voting securities, on 60 days' written notice to the invest-
'4 Section 10 of the Investment Company Act requires that, except for certain
no load funds, at least 40% of the directors of a mutual fund must be persons who are
neither officers or employees of the fund nor affiliated with the fund's investment
adviser or its affiliates. In addition, section 10 requires that a majority of the directors
must be persons who are not investment bankers or principal underwriters or regular
brokers of the fund or affiliated persons of such investment banker, underwriter or
broker. 54 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80a-10 (1964).
15 The unaffiliated directors' tasks in these areas-heavy as they are--do not
exhaust their responsibilities under the Investment Company Act or under state law.
The best discussion of the full range of their duties appears in Jaretzki, .npra note 9.
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ment adviser. The agreement may not continue in effect for a period
of more than two years from the date of its original execution, unless
such continuance is specifically approved at least annually by the board
of directors-including approval by a majority of the directors who
are unaffiliated with the investment adviser-or by vote of a majority
of the outstanding voting securities of the fund.1" Whenever the
agreement is submitted to the shareholders of the fund, whether for
initial or subsequent approval, the directors have a responsibility to
evaluate the arrangement and make a recommendation to the
shareholders.
The Investment Company Act of 1940, therefore, contemplates
that the directors of the fund will play an important role in determin-
ing the arrangements which will be made to provide for the investment
advice. Further, the act contemplates that a crucial role will be played
by those directors who are unaffiliated with the investment adviser.
The act does not, however, require that the unaffiliated directors take
an active role in managing the investments of the fund. They need
not be experts in investments and are not expected to review the
advisability of each individual investment decision. Their responsi-
bility on these matters may properly be limited to insuring that invest-
ment action furthers the investment policies of and is within the re-
strictions applicable to the fund.
The unaffiliated directors' major task in this area consists of
evaluating the quality of the investment advice received by the fund.
This review often seems to be made on the assumption that the existing
investment adviser (particularly when the investment adviser is the
sponsor of the fund) has a vested right to remain the investment
adviser of the fund-that the investment adviser has a property right
in having the investment advisory agreement renewed. Such an
assumption runs counter to the provisions of the Investment Company
Act. On the other hand, as the Commission report points out, it is
probably a practical impossibility, in most cases, for a fund to change
advisers without the acquiescence of the existing adviserY7
A mutual fund is basically a vehicle through which numerous
individuals can purchase diversification and investment advice. The
investment advice is not custom tailored to all the investment goals
and needs of each individual participant, but is intended to serve those
investment goals and needs (expressed by the fund's stated investment
policy) which are shared by the participating investors. The collective
will of these investors is represented by the directors, and particularly
l6Investment Company Act §§15(a), (c), 54 Stat. 812, 813 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§§80a-15(a), (c).
11 SEC Mutual Fund Report 131.
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by the unaffiliated directors. When the unaffiliated directors consider
a specific arrangement with an investment adviser, they should apply
standards which are the same as those applied by a prudent individual
investor in considering an arrangement for securing advice for his
personal fortune.
When the unaffiliated directors consider the arrangements made
for providing investment advice, logically, the first question they must
ask relates to whether or not the present arrangements should be
continued. Although the answer to that question will normally be
"yes," the unaffiliated directors should inform themselves about avail-
able alternatives. In this connection the unaffiliated directors must
determine whether or not the fund can retain, without undue cost or
risk, sufficient flexibility to change its arrangements for securing
investment advice if for any reason such a change is thought desirable.
For example, does the fund have a right (or is it important that it
should have a right) to keep copies of the reports and analyses which
support the investment decisions made with respect to its portfolio.
The size of a fund (or the size of the complex of funds of which it
is a part) may dictate different answers to the degree of flexibility
which it is possible or desirable to maintain. When a fund or a
complex of funds reaches a certain size, the unaffiliated directors may
decide that the most satisfactory arrangement involves internalizing
the system for providing investment advice. At other stages of a
fund's existence, the unaffiliated directors-from the point of view
of both increased efficiency and increased flexibility-may feel that it
is desirable to have the fund perform certain of the managerial functions
for itself (or in cooperation with other funds in the complex).
The unaffiliated directors' attitude toward existing arrangements
will depend upon their evaluation of the quality of the services rendered.
One aspect of this evaluation involves a study of the performance of
the mutual fund in relation to its stated objectives. In looking at
performance, the unaffiliated directors should evaluate both the long-
term performance record and the short-term performance record: the
former to give the adviser a fair chance to prove itself and the latter
to spot trends as they occur. Conclusions about performance should
also take into account the degree of risk to which the fund was ex-
posed in achieving its performance.-8
The unaffiliated directors should also inform themselves about
the investment adviser-how it operates and how it is staffed. Such
18There are problems in devising satisfactory standards for measuring perform-
ance. For discussion of a recent effort conducted under the general supervision of
Professor James H. Lorie, Director of the Center for Research in Security Prices
at the University of Chicago, see Robinson, Measuring Pension Fund Performance,
106 TRUSTS & ESTATES 251 (1967).
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information is important in evaluating the ability of the investment
adviser to perform, on a sustained basis, the kind of work that the
fund requires. For example, is the adviser's success based on the
ability of one or two key individuals? What happens if the key indi-
vidual dies or leaves the investment adviser? Other areas of inquiry
might include the adviser's willingness to explore the validity of newly
developed investment approaches rather than proceeding blindly along
traditional routes.
Although the unaffiliated directors should remember that the fund
is not frozen into its existing arrangements for securing investment
advice, they should also realize that changes in these arrangements
can take a variety of forms. The attempt to effect a drastic change,
such as the firing of the existing investment adviser and hiring a new
one, can be very disruptive and should not be undertaken lightly.
Milder measures, such as changes in certain of the investment adviser's
personnel, may provide a sufficient remedy for the deficiencies found
by the unaffiliated directors.
Although the most important area about which the unaffiliated
directors must satisfy themselves is the ability of the investment adviser
to perform the services which the fund requires, the amount paid for
such services is also an important, if secondary, consideration. The fees
paid to investment advisers in the mutual fund industry have gen-
erally been based on a percentage of net assets. Typically, these per-
centages start at one-half of one percent, with some scale-downs in the
fee for assets over a certain amount. Studies show that growth in
asset size is not accompanied by a proportionate growth in the costs
of managing these assets.' 9 Indeed, in some situations the costs of
management may not grow at all. To the extent that the scale-downs
are not meaningfully related to the economies which size achieves in
management costs, the present structure permits the compensation of
the investment adviser to be based partly on the standard of how suc-
cessfully shares of the fund have been sold. The Commission's recent
report concluded that the primary beneficiary of the present system of
compensation has been the investment adviser rather than the fund
shareholder.
There have been attempts to justify the present system. One
frequently used argument is that each individual investor, with an
average shareholding of roughly $6,500 20 pays (even at the rate of
one-half of one percent) only $32.50 per year for expert investment
advice. The cost of this advice is, so the argument runs, approxi-
19 Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R.
REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1962).2 Do INVESTMENT Com AxY INswruTiE, THFE MuTuAL FUND SHAREoDR~ 4 (1966).
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mately the same as the cost of a subscription to the Wall Street
Journal.2 ' A variation of this argument points out that the individual
investor could not buy investment management elsewhere at a cheaper
rate.2 It was pointed out earlier that the investment advice provided
is not custom tailored to the individual needs of the shareholders, but
is designed to serve certain common needs of the shareholders as a
group. It is not unreasonable for these shareholders to expect, among
other things, that the bargaining power generated by the aggregation
of their investments will be utilized to produce, if possible, a more
advantageous fee than would be paid if each individual shareholder had
to bargain for himself.
In determining whether the amount of the fee is proper, the un-
affiliated directors should have a variety of information. They should
be aware of what expenses the fund has to pay in addition to the
advisory fee in order to provide necessary services for its shareholders.
They must recognize that the investment advisory fee may cover either
a narrow or a broad range of services.
The unaffiliated directors should also look at the cost of com-
parable services. The Commission's report suggested that the fees
charged for investment management by investment counsellors, banks
and other institutions reflect arms'-length bargaining and provide some
basis for comparison. Although there may be adequate grounds to
justify differences in the fees charged,2" it is both proper and desirable
that the unaffiliated directors ask the adviser to explain, if it is the
case, why the fund should pay more than other clients for investment
advisory services. In addition, the unaffiliated directors will also want
to satisfy themselves that it is reasonable for the fund to have an
expense ratio which is larger than that paid by a fund of comparable
size whose investment advisory services are internally generated.
It is also appropriate for the unaffiliated directors to ask how
much it costs the investment adviser to provide the fund with the
services which it has agreed to furnish. In determining whether or
not the fees charged for providing advice are reasonable, it may often
be helpful to look at the profit made by the adviser on this aspect
of the operation. (A large profit should not necessarily be taken
21 The cost of a subscription to the Wall Street Journal is $26 a year.
22 This argument is made in a letter from William F. Shelley, Jan. 26, 1967.
23 A significant difference referred to in the report relates to the entrepreneurial
risk which an adviser takes when it organizes a new fund. SEC Mutual Fund Report
116. In the early years of the fund many advisers suffered losses or made only very
small profits. Conference 755 (comments of Joseph E. Welch). The Commission's
General Counsel has stated that, within limits, "the contribution made and the losses
incurred in getting a fund going should be considered in determining whether or not
the fee is reasonable." Conference 756 (comments of Philip A. Loomis).
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as an indication of unreasonably high profits-otherwise, a premium
may be paid for inefficiency.) Looking at the profit of the
adviser may be helpful because, as a result of the typically close
affiliation in the industry between the mutual fund and its in-
vestment adviser, competitive forces probably do not operate effec-
tively to set guidelines for a fair fee. Many unaffiliated directors
seem to think that it is unseemly to ask an adviser how much money
he is making on the advisory services. Although profits of investment
advisers normally are not examined by non-mutual fund clients when
the amount of fees to be charged is discussed, bargaining (including a
willingness and ability to change investment advisers) by sophisticated
investors and by professionals about the amount of the fees to be paid
to the adviser is traditional. The competitive forces operating under
these circumstances make it unnecessary to seek external standards
for determining a fair fee. Further, when fees are paid directly to
individuals and one has a fair idea how much time is spent by such
individuals in performing the work for which such fees are paid, judg-
ments with respect to the reasonableness of a fee are much easier to
make than in the mutual fund situation where the unaffiliated
directors may have little idea how much time is spent by various indi-
viduals in the investment advisory firm on the fund's business. In
this connection, the unaffiliated director should know something about
the total business of the investment adviser. For example, he should
know if the investment adviser serves a complex of funds or other
clients and uses substantially the same persons and data to generate
investment advice for some or all of them. This information is useful
in light of the previously stated principle that the costs of providing
investment advice generally do not increase proportionately with an
increase in the size of the assets managed.
As was pointed out previously, almost all fee arrangements in the
investment company industry are based on a percentage of net assets.
There is no requirement that they be so determined. Directors should
give consideration to other arrangements. For example, under certain
circumstances, it may make sense to negotiate a flat fee arrangement
which will permit the investment adviser to maintain a certain size staff
and quality of organization. The negotiation of a flat fee arrange-
ment might be combined with a formula which will give the adviser a
bonus if the fund's performance achieves certain objectives (and, pos-
sibly, a penalty if it does not). On the other hand, care must be taken
so that the formula does not tempt the adviser to subject the fund's
assets to unwarranted risk in order to earn the bonus.24
24See SEC Mutual Fund Report 345.
1967]
1068 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.115:1058
In addition, mutual funds have traditionally conducted negotia-
tions with respect to investment advisory arrangements separately from
other funds in the same complex. There are no statutory reasons to
do so and in many cases it may make better sense for all the funds in
a complex to bargain with the investment adviser on a joint basis.
Discussions of the duties and responsibilities of unaffiliated direc-
tors in making arrangements for providing investment management
services to the fund-and in other areas too-tend to emphasize the
unaffiliated directors' lack of power to implement their ideas. It is
argued that fund shareholders bought the fund on the reputation of
the adviser-not the reputation of the board of directors. Thus share-
holders do not expect that the directors will refuse to renew the invest-
ment advisory agreement. Even if the unaffiliated directors wished to
do so, in many cases they (or those who object) do not constitute a
majority of the board of directors and do not control the proxy
machinery. Finally, as suggested previously, severing relations with
the existing investment adviser (and as a practical consequence with
the principal underwriter who, as pointed out, normally is affiliated
with the investment adviser) involves such a major change in the
operation of the fund that directors will be reluctant to undertake such
action. These circumstances, it is argued, deprive the unaffiliated
director of the ultimate economic power needed to win meaningful
concessions at the bargaining table.
This conclusion fails to give sufficient weight to at least two
important kinds of power which unaffiliated directors do possess.
Whatever their legal obligations, businessmen want to do what is
"right"--or at least they want to appear to their peers to be doing
what is right. Strong and reasoned objections by fellow board
members to a particular contract or course of action on the ground of
unfairness to fund shareholders will, in many cases, produce modifica-
tions of the contract or course of action. In addition to this informal
power, unaffiliated directors also have real power insofar as they have
a right to have their objections to certain courses of action-including
their disapproval of an advisory contract which is submitted to share-
holders-set forth in the proxy statement. Threat of a public state-
ments by unaffiliated directors that a particular contract or course of
action is unfair to fund shareholders provides an effective bargaining
weapon because a fund sponsor will be reluctant to incur the risk of
unfavorable publicity which such a public statement would produce.
Arrangements for Distribution of Mutual Fund Shares
The procedures which a mutual fund must follow in arranging
for the distribution of its shares are similar to those which a fund
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must follow in arranging for investment advice. 5 The Investment
Company Act contemplates that the directors (and particularly the
unaffiliated directors) will play an important role in making these
arrangements. Many unaffiliated directors seem to be unaware of
their responsibility in overseeing the arrangements made for the dis-
tribution of fund shares. Others seem to think that their responsibility
is limited to insuring that the arrangements do not violate any provi-
sion of law.
This attitude may stem, in part, from a feeling that purchasers
of mutual fund shares are strangers to the fund and, therefore, persons
to whom the unaffiliated directors owe no duty. However, a sub-
stantial portion of fund share sales are made to existing shareholders-
both as a result of the reinvestment of dividends26 and as a result
of repeat business. In addition, a major selling point for fund shares
is that through this medium, diversification and expert investment ad-
vice can be obtained at a relatively low cost. From the purchaser's
point of view, the sales charge is an element of the cost of providing
investment management and, therefore, the unaffiliated directors of the
fund should properly be concerned that the cost remain as low as pos-
sible. On the other hand, the fund has a legitimate interest, under most
circumstances, in a steady volume of sales." Maintenance of a steady
volume of sales seems to require adequate compensation to the sellers
of the shares. Thus the unaffiliated directors have the responsibility
of balancing the cost to each new shareholder of obtaining sales
volume against the benefits which such volume confers upon all the
shareholders. In making this determination, the unaffiliated directors
should at least know how much is being paid-directly through the
sales load and indirectly through brokerage reciprocals-to finance
the selling effort.2"
Unaffiliated directors also must be concerned with the way in
which mutual fund shares are sold. As suggested above, directors
want to be sure that the distribution system adopted by the fund
25 See Investment Company Act §§ 15(b)-(c), 54 Stat 812, 813 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-15 (b) -(c). See text accompanying note 16 supra.
26A large proportion of fund shareholders also reinvest capital gain distributions.
No sales load is charged on such reinvestment. Practice with respect to the reinvest-
ment of dividends varies within the industry. SEC Mutual Fund Report 215.
27The Commission report raised questions with respect to the desirability of
further growth for the largest funds. SEC Mutzwal Fund Report 263. The validity
of this conclusion has been vigorously challenged. Conferetwe 683-85 (comments of
William B. Moses).
28 It should be recognized that downward revisions of the rewards paid to the
retailers of fund shares may be much more difficult to achieve than revisions in the
management fees. The rewards presently paid the retailers are set by arms-length
bargaining and the retailer has, in many respects, the vastly superior bargaining
position. On the other hand, directors should not take a "sales at any price" view.
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produces sales-that it performs well. On the other hand, these sales
should be the result of responsible selling techniques. Poor selling
practices can often result in bad publicity for the fund. As a con-
sequence of such publicity, future sales of shares may be hampered and,
possibly, wholesale redemption of shares may result. Although it is
obviously not possible for the unaffiliated directors to review the sales
practices of all the retail distributors of the fund's shares (except where
the shares are retailed exclusively by only one or two organizations),
they should be knowledgeable about sales practices generally used in
the industry, and they should critically review the procedures, if any,
that the principal underwriter of the fund's shares has adopted to see
that such shares are properly sold. They should receive and study
copies of the advertising and sales literature used to sell the fund's
shares. They should be particularly sensitive in areas where abuses
are likely to appear. For example, the Commission's report pointed
out that purchasers of shares through contractual plans frequently paid
very high (up to fifty per cent) effective sales loads as a result of high
redemption and lapse rates.29 Such results suggest the presence of poor
selling and poor follow-up. Unaffiliated directors of funds whose shares
are sold through contractual plans should request information about re-
demption and lapse rates and satisfy themselves that existing rates
are consistent with adequate supervision of sales and follow-up efforts.
Portfolio Transactions
In connection with the creation of arrangements for providing
investment advice to the fund and arrangements for the distribution
of its shares, the unaffiliated directors should consider the extent to
which the brokerage business generated by the fund has been utilized
for its benefit. As the Commission's report pointed out, the brokerage
which a mutual fund generates is a valuable asset which can be used
to purchase various kinds of services. However, as the report also
noted, the services which are purchased often seem to be of greater
benefit to the investment adviser or the principal underwriter of the
fund than to the fund itself.30
It is the duty of the directors to see that the fund derives the
maximum benefit from its portfolio transactions, both in the form of
services and in obtaining the best terms for such transactions. The
unaffiliated directors can obtain information concerning the amount of
such brokerage business and its use from Form N-1R. 1 They should
29 SEC Mutual Fund Report 238.
30 See note 12 supra.
31 Form N-1R, items 1.31, 1.32, 2.17, 2.18, 2.19, 2.28, 17 C.F.R. § 274.101 at 204,
214, 216 (Supp. 1966).
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require that Form N-1R information be supplemented by periodic re-
ports on the disposition of brokerage business, and they may consider it
helpful to review the execution of a random selection of portfolio trans-
actions in order to satisfy themselves that portfolio transactions are
being executed in a way which obtains the maximum benefits and best
terms available to the fund. In determining what is a proper invest-
ment advisory fee, they will want to take into account any services
used by the investment adviser in furnishing advice to the fund which,
in effect, have been purchased by the fund. In addition, the unaffiliated
directors should find out whether services presently paid for in cash
by the fund could be purchased with such brokerage business. Further,
they should ascertain whether or not the fund can conveniently and
properly utilize some of the devices (such as the give-up to non-member
firms in transactions executed on certain regional exchanges) which
have been developed to permit funds to get what is essentially a rebate
on brokerage commissions. 3 If brokerage business has been used
to provide additional rewards to those persons who have sold fund
shares, the unaffiliated directors may, as suggested previously, want
to consider the amount of such brokerage in determining whether
the sales charges are reasonable.
Conclusion
Even this brief discussion should make plain that the tasks of the
unaffiliated directors are of great importance and require effort, thought
and imagination. To do their job properly, the unaffiliated directors
must acquire a relatively sophisticated knowledge of the operations of
mutual funds and of certain aspects of the securities business.
In performing the specific tasks related to arranging for invest-
ment advice and for the distribution of shares, and generally in per-
forming their overseer functions, the unaffiliated directors should not
hesitate to consult with and rely upon experts available to the fund.
These experts normally include a certified public accountant and legal
3 2 The Commission has recently instituted administrative proceedings against two
funds and their adviser on the ground that the adviser caused the funds to incur
unnecessary brokerage costs and charges by interposing a seller of the funds' shares
between the fund and other dealers in over-the-counter market transactions. In the
Matter of Delaware Fund, Administrative Proceeding, File Nos. 3-1002, 3-1003,
3-1004, March 27, 1967. Shareholder suits are pending against a number of funds
and their advisers alleging failure to make adequate use of the Third Market in
executing transactions in New York Stock Exchange-listed securities. Transactions
in the Third Market are not subject to the New York Stock Exchange minimum
commission rate rules, and thus the use of the Third Market by a fund may at times
result in cheaper executions. The Third Market is described in DUKE UxivEasrrY
Sc3ooL oF LAiw, CoNFE ENcE oN SEcuRITms REGuLATIoN 171-90 (Mundheim ed.
1965).
33 One use of the regional exchange to provide the fund with a rebate on brokerage
commissions is described in Conferetce at 832-33 (comments of Robert M. Loeffler).
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counsel. It is not unusual in the fund industry for the accountant and
counsel hired by the fund to be the same accountant and counsel used by
the fund's investment adviser and principal underwriter or affiliated
broker. This arrangement probably keeps accounting and legal fees to a
minimum. On the other hand, such an arrangement is not required and,
in light of the many areas of conflicting interest between the fund and
its adviser and underwriter or affiliated broker, the unaffiliated directors
may consider it worthwhile for the fund to hire (either full-time or
for special occasions) certified public accountants and counsel who
are free at all times to represent only the interests of the fund."
34 The unaffiliated directors of funds large enough to support independent personnel
will also want to consider the desirability of hiring a chief executive who is unaffiliated
with the investment adviser or principal underwriter of the fund.
